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Saxony's rapid industrialization in the 1840s hastened the decline of its traditional manufacturing 
trades and thus contributed to social unrest throughout the kingdom. Overpopulation and economic 
recession complicated the modernization process, giving rise to the protest movements which culminated 
in the Revolution of 1848. In the following decade, economists in the interior ministry sought a means 
of smoothing the transition to an industrial society by gradually dismantling the guild organization of 
labour. Saxony modernized its economic institutions under the leadership of Albert Christian Weinlig , 
an enlightened bureaucrat determined to protect those workers threatened by technological change. 
After the unification of Germany, Bismarck followed a course similar to Weinlig' s, enabling a conservative 
social order to assimilate peacefully the industrial revolution. 
L' industrialisation rapide de La Saxe dans les annees 1840 accelera le declin des metiers traditionnels 
et ne Jut done pas etrangere au climat d' agitation sociale qui secoua toutle royaume. La surpopulation 
et La recession economique compliquerent ce processus de modernisation en favorisant La montee de 
mouvements de protestation dont le point culminant Jut La Revolution de 1848. Au cours de La decennie 
suivante, les economistes du ministere de l' lnterieur rechercherent les moyens de rendre moins brutale 
La transition cl une societe industrielle en demantelant graduellement le systeme des corporations. La 
Saxe modernisa ses institutions economiques sous le leadership d'Albert Christian Weinlig, un ministre 
eclaire determine cl proteger les travailleurs menaces par les changements technologiques. Apres l' unification 
de l'Allemagne, Bismarck suivit une voie semblable cl celle de Weinlig, ce qui permit cl un ordre social 
conservateur d' assimiler pacifiquement La revolution industrielle. 
During the two middle decades of the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of 
Saxony experienced what might be called a "crisis of modernity". Rapid indus-
trialization, particularly in textile manufacturing, altered the country's economic 
structure by gradually replacing the skilled craftsman with the factory operative. 
Mechanization created a new working class which, for a number of years, coexisted 
with traditional artisan labour. Competition from the factories further eroded the 
position of the guilds, organizers of the production of manufactured goods from 
time immemorial. Handworkers, who had customarily matured in their trades within 
the guild system, found their progress blocked both by the large numbers of journeymen 
seeking master status and by the unemployment inflicted on the weaving trades by 
machines. As an industrial economy supplanted the traditional one, Saxony entered 
a period of social conflict punctuated by violence and the clash of ideologies. The 
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ferment sprang from circumstances which, if not unique, were more pronounced 
in Saxony than elsewhere in the German Confederation because of the kingdom's 
rapid industrialization. 
Between 1830 and 1848, a period called the "pre-March" by German historians, 
Saxony experienced artisan protest, quarrels between conservatives and modernizers 
and general unrest on aH levels of society. These currents eventually converged in 
the Revolution of 1848-49, the last great battle of which was the May Uprising in 
Dresden. Following this confused and sometimes violent interlude, the Saxon gov-
ernment resumed its efforts to assimilate the industrial revolution into an essentially 
conservative social order. When unified Germany confronted a similar set of problems 
a generation later, useful precedents already existed. In the 1880s, Bismarck's 
Reich followed a path pioneered in Saxony as the Elbian kingdom grappled with 
the cumulative effects of modernization on its social and political institutions. 
Always loath to acknowledge the sources of his inspiration, the Iron Chancellor 
resented Saxony as "the 'intellectual creator' of all opposition to the Reich." 1 Yet 
Saxon statesmen had something to teach their Pruss ian counterparts. Baron Friedrich 
Ferdinand von Beust, whom Bismarck soon came to detest, conducted a brilliantly 
devious foreign policy from 1849 until Prussia's military victory in 1866.2 Albert 
Christian Weinlig devised an economic strategy which assumed the inevitability of 
modernization, thereby teaching Berlin how to keep an industrial revolution from 
becoming a political one. The Saxon industrial law of 1861 thus served as a model 
for similar legislation in the North German Confederation in 1869. 3 By example, 
in both foreign and domestic affairs, a relatively powerless state contributed significantly 
to the evolution of imperial Germany. 
With an area of only 14,960 square kilometers occupied in 1849 by slightly 
less than two million people (one-third of whom were urban dwellers), Saxony's 
population density was the highest in Europe except for Lombardy. 4 A demographic 
revolution began about 1750, producing an 82 percent increase in the population 
over the next century ; 57 percent of this growth occurred after 1815. Between 1834 
and 1910, the annual rate of expansion was 14.6 percent, compared with 9.8 percent 
in the rest of Germany. 5 This population explosion quickly overtaxed the resources 
of an economy which, early in the nineteenth century, was still agriculturally based 
I. Hans PHILIPPI, "Preussisch-sachsische Verstimrnungen im Jahrzehnt nach der Reichsgriin-
dung" , in Jahrbuch fiir die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands (1966), p. 253. 
2. Bismarck's diplomacy during the unification period strongly resembles that of Beust in 
1849-50. See Richard J. BAZILLION, "Saxon Liberalism and the German Question in the Wake of the 
1848 Revolution", Canadian Journal of History, XIII (April 1978): 61-84 and Helmut RUMPLER, Die 
deutsche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust, 1848-1850. Zur Problematik mittelstaatlicher Reformpolitik 
im Zeitalter der Paulskirche (Vienna: Verlag Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1972). 
3. As one of Saxony's delegates to the Bundesrat, and as Referent for the draft of the 1869 
industrial law, Weinlig was able personally to introduce a number of refinements. Karl BRAUER, ''Albert 
Christian Weinlig. Ein deutscher Volkswirt und Staatsmann des 19. Jahrhunderts", in Lebensbilder 
siichsischer Wirtschaftsfiihrer, ed. Erich DITTRICH (Leipzig: Oskar Leiner Verlag, 1941), p. 413; Richard 
LIPINSKI, Die Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung in Leipzig (Leipzig: Verlag der Leipziger 
Buchdruckerei, 1931) , p. 183. 
4 . Karl GROSSE, Geschichte der Stadt Leipzig von der iiltesten bis auf die neueste Zeit (Leipzig: 
C.B. Polet, 1842), p. 704. 
5. Karlheinz BLASCHKE, " Industrialisierung und Bevolkerung in Sachsen im Zeitraum von 
1830 bis 1890", Historische Raumforschung, V (1965): 69. 
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and relatively unproductive. After 1815 Saxon farmers could no longer produce 
enough food to meet domestic needs and the country came to rely on imports, for 
which it had to find a means to pay. The requirement to cultivate an export market 
became a powerful stimulus to industrial development, reinforced in Saxony's case 
by a set of fortunate circumstances. 6 
An enlightened government known for its ties with Leipzig's merchant com-
munity pursued a successful mercantilist policy from the 1760s into the industrial 
age. 7 This regime, slowly evolving toward a constitutional system, began the long 
process of dismantling guild control over the economy. Independent entrepreneurs 
seized the opportunity to compete with the various textile monopolies, readily 
borrowing foreign technology and thus laying the foundations of an industrial 
infrastructure. Abundant labour supplies and water power, together with the willingness 
to import raw materials as well as foodstuffs, had placed the economy firmly on 
the road toward modernization by the end of the eighteenth century. Less than fifty 
years later, commerce and industry supplanted agriculture as the mainstay of Saxony's 
economy. 8 The inexorability of technological change also had become an accepted 
fact among the middle class. As mechanization surged ahead in the years after 
Napoleon's defeat, one chronicler of the industrial revolution proclaimed: "Any 
kind of opposition is fruitless, even dangerous; progress is indispensable, and to 
facilitate it no means may be spared and no measures rejected. " 9 Serious obstacles 
nevertheless stood in the path of continued economic development. 
The resumption of competition from English textiles following the end of the 
Continental system resulted in a marked deterioration in Saxony's economic position 
by 1817. To make matters worse, Prussia raised a protective tariff in 1818 in order 
to weld its widely separated territories into a unified trading area. Saxony consequently 
lost its markets in north Germany and found its access to seaports impeded by high 
transit tolls. For the next ten years, hard times afflicted the Erzgebirge and Vogtland 
regions where the kingdom's largest textile industries were situated_Io As an exporter 
of manufactured goods to highly competitive international mar~ets, Saxony fell 
victim to circumstances almost entirely beyond its control. Yet the country's political 
and economic elites managed to respond creatively to an adverse situation. 
Government and private enterprise joined forces to stimulate technological 
innovation as a means of improving manufacturing processes. A state-sponsored 
6. Sources for the foregoing population data are: Sidney POLLARD, Peaceful Conquest: The 
Industrialization of Europe, 1760-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 357, n. 27; Hubert 
KIESEWETTER, "Beviilkerung, Erwerbstiitige und Landwirtschaft im Kiinigreich Sachsen, 1815-1871", 
in Region und lndustrialisierung: Studien zur Rolle der Region in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten 
zwei Jahrhunderte, ed. Sidney POLLARD (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), pp. 91ff.; BLASCHKE, 
"Industrialisierung und Beviilkerung", p. 71. 
7. Frank B. TIPTON, Jr., Regional Variations in the Economic Development of Germany during 
the Nineteenth Century (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976), p. 31; Richard DIETRICH, 
''Zur industriellen Produktion, technischen Entwicklung und zum Unternehmertum in Mitteldeutschland, 
speziell in Sachsen im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung", Jahrbuch for die Geschichte Mittel- und Ost-
deutschlands, XXVIII (1979): 261. 
8. BLAS€HKE, "Industrialisierung und Beviilkerung", p. 70. 
9. Friedrich George WIECK, Die Manufaktur- und Fabrikindustrie des Konigreichs Sachsen 
(Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1845), p. 2. 
10. Herbert P6NICKE, Sachsens Entwicklung zum Jndustriestaate, /830-1871 (Dresden : Wilhelm 
Volkmann Verlag, 1934), pp. 9-10. 
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organization fostering technical education began operating in 1828. Polytechnic 
institutes and Sunday schools, both supported by the government, attracted young 
artisans wishing to acquire advanced skills. The economic reformers also founded 
industrial organizations, mounted product exhibitions and dispatched agents abroad 
to bring back the latest techniques. In 1825, the royal house itself invested in the 
economy by helping to finance the Elbe-West Indian Company, which exported 
450,000 thaler worth of linen and cotton goods during its first year of operation. 
Though quite successful at first, this venture collapsed in 1826-27 because offoreign 
competition and political instability in its trading areas. Without access to internal 
German markets, all of Saxony's efforts to become economically self-sufficient 
eventually proved fruitless. 11 
With Zollverein membership in 1834 came the large, accessible and stable 
trading area that provided Saxony with the opportunity to capitalize on its main 
assets: technical ingenuity, entrepreneurial skill and a virtually inexhaustible labour 
supply. Industrialists applied steam power to manufacturing and transportation, 
locating factories just outside the cities and shipping in raw materials from elsewhere. 
The Leipzig to Dresden railway (1839) became a model for similar enterprises at 
home and abroad. The country's transportation revolution thus coincided with and 
reinforced its industrial revolution. By combining the latest technology imported 
from Western Europe with easily exploited natural resources and cheap domestic 
labour, Saxon industry reached new levels of prosperity by 1840. 
In that year the Landtag passed a law removing many ancient restrictions on 
trade and industry in the countryside. This statute carried forward a process begun 
in 1827, when Eduard von Wietersheim, who served as minister of culture from 
1840 to 1848, submitted a memorandum calling for the exemption of factory production 
from guild regulation. 12 Enterprises, such as linen weaving, that had operated 
outside the jurisdiction of urban guilds, were now permitted to move into rural 
areas and to recruit a labour force locally. Such regulated trades as weaving and 
stocking-making also gained the right to migrate beyond the cities. On the other 
hand, in order to protect cobblers, saddlers, carpenters, bakers, smiths and other 
artisans from proletarianization, the law imposed limits on the number of tradesmen 
who might set up shop in a given territory. Perceiving immediately the new legislation's 
bias in favor of the factory, ''the petty-bourgeois urban guilds'' opened a campaign 
which delayed the implementation of full-scale industrial freedom for a generation. 13 
In spite of the guilds' spirited defence of their ancient privileges, it was clear 
in 1840 that a modem economic system had taken root in Saxon soil. Although 
the industrial component still appeared insignificant when contrasted with the size 
of the traditional manufacturing sector, a profound change was underway. According 
to an open letter from a group of Leipzig artisans, published in 1848, "two-thirds 
11. PoNICKE, Sachsens Entwicklung, pp. 10-11; Rudolf FORBERGER, "Zur Wandlung der ge-
werblichen Betriebsweise Sachsens in der ersten Hlilfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Der Obergang von Manufaktur 
zur Fabrik im Textilgewerbe", in Probleme der Okonomie und Politik in den Beziehungen zwischen 
Ost- und Westeuropa von 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwan, ed. Karl 0BERMANN (Berlin: Rutten & 
Loening, 1960), pp. 125-37. 
12. Gerhard ScHMIDT, Die Staatsreform in Sachsen in der ersten Hiilfte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
(Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1966), p. 99. 
13. Ibid., p. 158. 
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of the inhabitants of our cities consist of handicraft workers and their dependents.'' 14 
Some fourteen years earlier, Saxony's urban population already numbered 528,725, 
or 33 percent of the kingdom's 1,596,206 peopleY Thus, some 317,000 Saxons 
had a direct stake in the fate of the guilds at a time when scarcely one-tenth that 
number derived their living from the factories. Of the 230,000 factory and handworkers 
in Saxony, 74 percent of whom were employed in textile manufacture, only 30,000 
(13 percent) belonged to the industrial proletariat which already predominated in 
England. 16 Most of Saxony's industrial labour force worked the 35,000 looms, four 
hundred of which were mechanized, scattered throughout the Erzgebirge, Vogtland 
and Oberlausitz districts. 17 Until the onset of recession later in the decade, handloom 
weaving occupied growing numbers of cottage labourers producing textiles for the 
export market. For this reason, the manufacturing population of Saxony in the pre-
March period contained the highest percentage of handicraftsmen in Germany: one 
in every 13 .4 Saxons was a hand worker, while in Prussia the figure was one in 
every 20.5. 18 
The presence of a dynamic modem sector in an economy still dominated by 
artisan manufacture heightened the contrast between the old and new methods of 
production, and between the social and political institutions that existed to organize 
the provision of goods and services. Urban guilds and rural factories came face to 
face in the 1840s in a conflict that grew more acrimonious as the economic crisis 
deepened. In this struggle between the modem and traditional organization of labour, 
the guilds possessed a substantial power base. Not surprisingly, the clash between 
artisan manufacture and mechanized industry expressed itself in social and political 
unrest when, half-way through the 1840s, Saxony's economic fortunes declined, 
unemployment rose and the voices of protest became louder. 
Appalled by the spreading poverty caused by the recession, middle-class 
liberals now debated among themselves a phenomenon which they called "the 
social question". They inevitably disagreed over the proper solution. Those who 
applauded the economic reforms initiated in 1840 could easily agree with the analysis 
offered by Peter Franz Reichensperger, a Catholic liberal from industrializing Rhenish 
Prussia: "Germany's sickness is not a result mainly of overpopulation [as the 
Heidelberg historian, Werner Conze, believes] or of mechanization and excess 
factory industry, but is directly attributable to the lack of those very same machines 
and factories which should produce work and gain for our labourers instead of the 
English." 19 Another Rhinelander, the industrialist Friedrich Harkort, agreed that 
the factory system held the answer to the social question. Most liberals, however, 
14. Quoted in Theodore S. HAMEROW, "The German Artisan Movement, 1848-49", Journal 
of Central European Affairs, XXI (July, 1%1): 136. 
15. BLASCHKE, "Industrialisierung und Bevolkerung", p. 78. 
16. Rolf WEBER, Die Revolution in Sachsen 1848149: Entwicklung und Analyse ihrer Triebkriifte 
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1970), pp. 3, 6. In 1845 F.G. Wieck distinguished between cottage industry 
and "the system of closed establishments (i.e., factories), [which] is the route to a correct division of 
the proceeds of industry proportional to their respective factors, the physical and intellectual capacity 
and the power of capital." Manufaktur- und Fabrikindustrie, p. 5. 
17. WIECK, Manufaktur- und Fabrikindustrie, p. 41. 
18. WEBER, Revolution in Sachsen, p. 4. 
19. Quoted in Werner CoNZE, "Yom 'Pobel' zum 'Proletariat'. Sozialgeschichtliche Voraus-
setzungen fiir den Sozialismus in Deutschland", in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich 
WEHLER (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1968), p. 133. 
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blamed the modernization process itself for urban overcrowding, artisan unemployment 
and labour unrest, and defended the placing of some limitations on industrial 
development. 20 The businessmen, professionals and academics whom Donald Rohr 
has called "social liberals" tempered their enthusiasm for economic progress with 
concern for the working-class victims of industrialization. 21 They insisted that worker 
self-help, encouraged by an enlightened government policy, could relieve much 
distress among the lower classes and enable society to weather the crisis. 22 
The social liberals' concern for factory workers, day labourers, journeymen 
artisans and small master craftsmen who composed the mid-nineteenth-century 
"proletariat" arose from their desire to banish the "red spectre" conjured up by 
the social question. 23 Perhaps they realized, as one East German historian has 
asserted, that ''without the masses, their constitutional aims could not be achieved.'' 24 
There is some truth in this verdict, since the primary goals of all liberals were 
constitutional monarchy, parliamentary rule and a significant role for educated and 
propertied men in the political process. They wished, above all, to replace legislative 
representation based on traditional estates with an arrangement that recognized the 
changes which had occurred in the structure of society. To accomplish this required 
the creation of a party system on the English model. 25 So great were the obstacles 
to be overcome, that political reform commanded more of the liberals' attention 
than did the pursuit of social justice. 
To the displaced handicraftsmen themselves, liberalism, with or without its 
social conscience, appeared remote and superfluous. The victims of technological 
change derived little consolation from a philosophy closely attuned to the life 
experiences of society's most favoured members. For the journeyman artisan, in 
particular, the factory system championed by Harkort and Reichensperger posed a 
threat both to social standing and to economic survival. Opponents of industrialization 
among the traditional working class therefore ignored liberalism and other political 
ideologies until late in the 1840s. They turned instead to the most familiar of their 
social institutions, the church. Small producers of all kinds abandoned mainstream 
religion after 1844 and flocked to an amazingly popular anti-ecclesiastical movement 
called German Catholicism. 
East German historians identify German Catholicism with the protest against 
industrialization by declining occupational groups. The movement was indeed 
extraordinarily strong in Saxony, where the lower middle class (Kleinbiirgertum) 
20. James J. SHEEHAN, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 28ff. 
21. Donald G. RoHR, The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germany (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963). 
22. Wolfram FiscHER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter der lndustrialisierung: Aufsiitze-
Studien-Vortriige (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), pp. 227ff. 
23. Hans KRAUSE, Die Demokratische Partei von 1848 und die soziale Frage. Ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte der ersten deutschen Revolution (Frankfurt a.M.: Frankfurter Societiits-Druckerei, 1923), 
pp. 24-25. 
24. Siegfried SCHMIDT, "Biirgerliche Parteien und Volksmassen vom Vormiirz bis 1871 ", 
Jenaer Beitriige zur Parteiengeschichte, XL (1977): 19. 
25. Hans BoLDT, "Zwischen Patrimonialismus und Parlamentarismus. Zur Entwicklung vor-
parlamentarischer Theorien in der deutschen Staatslehre des Vormarz", in Gesellschaft, Parlament und 
Regierung. Zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus in Deutschland, ed. Gerhard A. RITTER (Dusseldorf: 
Droste Verlag, 1974), pp. 87-88. 
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constantly faced the prospect of proletarianization. 26 Early in the history of the 
protest movement, religious nonconformity acted as a surrogate for political action 
and helped to accustom future organizers of the democratic party, such as Robert 
Blum, Franz Wigard, F.X. Rewitzer and E.A. Rossmassler, to their leadership 
roles. Although economic hardship undoubtedly motivated a large number of their 
followers, these men opposed the Saxon regime for several reasons, among them 
its bureaucratic arbitrariness, secret administration of justice, aristocratic values 
and suppression of dissent. Consequently, they sought allies among the middle-
class liberals, led by the political journalist, editor and university professor, Karl 
Biedermann. By 1847, German Catholic democrats and Protestant liberal reformers 
presented a united front to the pre-March government, their common foe. 
Robert Blum, the democrats' charismatic leader, channeled religious, economic 
and political protest into a single movement. Blum and Wigard organized the 
Vaterlandsverein, the large democratic party of the revolutionary period, which had 
attracted more than 11,000 members by April1848. 27 Fully one-third of the German 
Catholic congregation in Dresden belonged to the Vaterlandsverein in 1848-49; in 
the period just before the outbreak of revolution, democratic and German Catholic 
strength in the industrializing centers of the Erzgebirge grew apace. Located in this 
region, where more than 30,000 workers were unemployed, were the majority of 
Saxony's twenty-two German Catholic congregations. 28 Religious revivalism, which 
flourished in the economically-depressed climate of the late 1840s, thus contributed 
significantly to the emergence of a unite~ political opposition at the end of the pre-
March period. 
As editor of the Siichsische Vaterlandsbliitter, published in Leipzig and read 
by democrats throughout the kingdom, Blum helped to secularize the values of 
German Catholicism and thereby to make its cause respectable among the liberal 
bourgeoisie. 29 Freedom of conscience, anti-clericalism, social consciousness, political 
self-determination, scientific rationalism and a desire for German unification in 
some form comprised the aims shared by Saxon democrats with the German Catholics 
and, in large measure, with the liberals. "No wonder", wrote Biedermann in 1846, 
"that Protestant Saxony saw in the victory and progress of German Catholicism 
the triumph of its own Protestant principle.'' 30 Liberals and democrats would part 
company soon enough, mainly over the issue of popular sovereignty; 31 but from 
1845 to the March Days their interests coincided. Their joint efforts to achieve 
religious toleration and other reforms grew out of a dissatisfaction with the kingdom's 
26. Giinter KoLBE, "Demokratische Opposition in religiosem Gewande: Zur Geschichte der 
deutschkatholischen Bewegung in Sachsen am Vorabend der Revolution von 1848/49'', Zeitschrift for 
Geschichts-Wissenschaft, XX, no. 9 (1972): 1102, 1105. 
27. WEBER, Revolution in Sachsen, p. 28. 
28. KoLBE, "Demokratische Opposition", p. 1107; WEBER, Revolution in Sachsen, p. 28; 
Karl BIEDERMANN, "Das Konigreich Sachsen vom Riicktritt des Miirzministeriums bis zum Schluss des 
Landtages 1849-50", Die Gegenwart, VI (Leipzig, 1851): 581. 
29. Blum himself founded the German Catholic congregation in Leipzig in February 1845. 
LIPINSKI, Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung. p. 28. 
30. Karl BIFDERMANN, "Siichisische Zustiinde", Unsre Gegenwart und Zukunft, I (1846):310-11. 
31. BOLDT, "Patrimonialismus und Parlamentarismus", p. 97. 
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condition so profound that it was able to bridge the rather vague class lines separating 
the liberal and democratic constituencies. 32 
A sharp downturn in the economy in 1846 shifted attention away from the 
campaign for civil rights and toward more basic issues such as unemployment and 
the social question. Saxony was a net importer of food in the best of times. But 
when the harvest failed, rising food prices soon outpaced wage levels and many 
workers in the marginal trades, especially weaving, faced the possibility of starvation. 
In 1847, for example, three hundred of Dresden's eight hundred master tailors were 
receiving welfare payments from their guild. Only workers in the machine-building 
factories earned the subsistence wage of three thalers a week. 33 The government, 
realizing very well that its efforts amounted to little more than a temporary expedient, 
tried to relieve unemployment by financing railway construction. A comprehensive 
economic strategy suited to the needs of both factory industry and the traditional 
crafts remained unwritten. At this stage in Saxony's industrial revolution, it was 
still too early to address the structural problems in the economy, the causes of 
which remained obscure. 
No one doubted by 1847 that the social question had become even more 
pressing, though many liberals missed the significance of the factory worker as a 
new type of "proletarian". "Only a few", wrote James J. Sheehan in his history 
of German liberalism, "saw industrial workers as the central element in the social 
question because the distinction between industrial and artisanal categories was only 
gradually emerging.'' 34 One of those who did appreciate the transformation wrought 
by industrialization in the structure of the working class was Karl Biedermann, 
leader of the Saxon liberal party from 1845 until the demise of the last democratically-
elected Landtag in June 1850. 
A native of Leipzig, Biedermann (1812-1901) was the illegitimate son of a 
Prussian officer and a parson's daughter. Robert von Mohl, a prominent liberal 
politician in Wiirttemberg and, like Biedermann, a member of the Frankfurt Parliament 
in 1848-49, once speculated that his Saxon colleague was "the natural brother of 
[Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von] Beust. " 35 The relationship, if it existed, was 
certainly ironic, since the two men were bitter political enemies for years and it 
was Beust who dismissed Biedermann from the Leipzig faculty in 1855. 36 Whatever 
Biedermann's antecedents, thanks to intellectual ability and his foster father's assistance 
he graduated from the universities of Heidelberg and Leipzig with a doctorate in 
philosophy. He taught in the University of Leipzig during the 1830s, but turned to 
32. In the 1840s and later, it was difficult to locate the social or ideological boundary between 
liberalism and democracy . A clear split of course developed in 1849 during the constitutional debate in 
Frankfurt over the merits of republicanism and monarchy. Toni OFFERMANN, Arbeiterbewegung und 
liberales Biirgertum in Deutschland 1850-1863 (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft , 1979), pp. 26-27. 
33. WEBER, Revolution in Sachsen, pp. 6-7. 
34. SHEEHAN , German Liberalism, p. 32. 
35. Universitiitsbibliothek Tiibingen, Handschriften- und Inkunab. Sammlung, Md. 613/100. 
Although the biographical sketch is unsigned, it is written in the first person and is found in a file 
containing several letters from Biedermann addressed to Mob! in Heidelberg. Authorship is attributed 
to Mob! in Joachim MULLER, " Karl Biedermann und die preussische Hegemonie in Deutschland. Yom 
Liberalismus zum Bonapartismus" (phil. diss . , Karl-Marx-Universitiit Leipzig, 1972), pp. 13-14. 
36. Richard J. BAZILLION, "A Scholar in Politics in Pre-March Saxony: the Biedermann Case", 
Societas-A Review of Social History, V, no. 3 (1975): 215-16. 
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journalism and independent historical research in the next decade. A proponent of 
the kleindeutsch (i.e. , pro-Prussian) solution to German unification in 1849 and 
thereafter, Biedermann devoted his attention during the pre-March period to the 
social implications of industrialization. 
Biedermann's analysis of the social question took the dichotomy between 
artisans and factory workers into account. 37 In a series of lectures on socialism, 
given before several hundred listeners in Leipzig and Dresden during the difficult 
winter of 1846-47, Biedermann treated the movement as a "menacing spectre" 
basically hostile toward modernization. 38 This warning echoed the words of Lorenz 
von Stein, a distinguished authority on French radicalism who had used similar 
language to describe the socialist threat. 39 Although Biedermann defended the idea 
of private property as ''belonging necessarily to the notion of human personality 
and independence" ,40 he cited British social legislation as an example of the need 
to place external controls on some individuals and groups in order to prevent their 
selfish misuse of economic power. No champion of unrestricted laissez-faire, Bied-
ermann cautioned against the sudden introduction of industrial freedom. As one 
who "saw the causes which actually called forth a worker's movement", 41 he 
understood that the two working classes, one composed of artisans and the other 
of factory labourers, had legitimate grievances which society ignored at its peril. 
Sympathy for the downtrodden reinforced Biedermann's longstanding conviction 
that change was inevitable, and that the best way to avoid upheaval was to reform 
social institutions before the pressure from below became too intense. 42 Biedermann 
shared with his fellow liberals the belief that constitutional rule, once achieved, 
would inspire a host of improvements in society generally. One substantial benefit 
would be an orderly transition to a modem industrial economy capable of ensuring 
peace and prosperity by converting the population surplus into a national asset. 43 
Because Biedermann regarded the modernization process as irreversible, he commended 
to readers of his weekly newspaper, Der Herold, the "practical view of an experienced 
businessman'' (Heinrich Bodemer, a Grossenhain cotton manufacturer) that ''cottage 
industry struggles against machines and the factory like a doomed rearguard against 
an overwhelming foe. " 44 The solution to structural unemployment was therefore 
to move the manufacturing process entirely into the factory, where wages, though 
low, were at least dependable even during economic crises that reduced cottage 
37. Winfried ScHULZE, "'Sozialistische Bestrebungen in Deutschland,' Bernerkungen zu einer 
Aufsatzfolge Karl Biedermanns (1846)", Vierteljahrschrift fiir Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 
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IV (1846): 327. 
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weavers to penury. Until the transition was completed, social insurance funded by 
private contributions could help to reduce the hardships suffered by workers in the 
declining trades. 
While liberal intellectuals and entrepreneurs, such as Biedermann and Bodemer, 
offered their advice, desperate handicraftsmen flocked into the democratic Vater-
landsverein. 45 Unable to stem the tide of popular opposition, Saxony's aristocratic 
cabinet fell victim on 13 March 1848, "to the spirit of the new age which it opposed 
so long and so vehemently. " 46 Power now passed to a group of liberal bureaucrats 
whose purpose was to create a modem constitutional state. Among them was Albert 
Christian Weinlig, a physician who had abandoned medicine for economics, taught 
for a year in Erlangen and finally joined the Saxon civil service in 1841. He proved 
to be exactly the type of enlightened bureaucrat with whom moderate liberals hoped 
to forge an alliance against "guild pressures and mercantilistic restrictions. " 47 
During the 1840s Weinlig headed the interior ministry's department of com-
mercial, industrial and agricultural affairs. His interest in technological development 
and national economy led him to concentrate on the problems associated with 
industrialization. Shortly before the outbreak of the 1848 revolution, he devised 
plans for a new statistical bureau and for the establishment of commercial and 
agricultural schools. Though his activity at- this time was almost entirely of a 
technical, administrative nature, events soon took him much further afield; ultimately 
he became the architect of Saxony's industrial society. 48 
The March Ministry assigned Weinlig to study the kingdom's economic situation, 
a task he began by obtaining information from factory owners, master artisans and 
workers of every kind. He chaired the ''Commission for the Discussion of Business 
and Labour Conditions'', whose membership included manufacturers, handicraftsmen, 
academics and technical experts. The 58-man commission set up some 700 local 
committees to consider proposals for "a reform of the industrial system (Gewer-
beverfassung) in the broadest sense of the term. " 49 According to an East German 
historian, the duty of operating these committees "absorbed ... all the energies 
of the Saxon workers' movement" after April 1848. 50 If so, then the government 
had good reason to be satisfied, though in the end the commission failed to solve 
the social question. 
Weinlig and his colleagues nevertheless made a magnificent attempt, collecting 
empirical data by means of a questionnaire containing 384 items distributed throughout 
Saxony. 51 Respondents were asked, among other things, to declare themselves for 
or against industrialization and to suggest improvements in factory operations, 
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Vereine by about 12,000 to 8,000. See WEBER, Revolution in Sachsen, pp. 28, 30. 
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transportation, patent law, the rules of competition and tariff regulations. The 
commission solicited details about living conditions among the working classes in 
order to formulate an effective social policy. While some groups, such as dedicated 
laissez-faire liberals, deplored what they regarded as state interference in the economy, 
most working-class Saxons greeted the commission as their saviour. The journeymen, 
whom Rudolf Stadelmann described as "intelligent, uprooted individuals who had 
innocently fallen between the grindstones of progress'', 52 proved to be especially 
vulnerable to false optin:iism. When their unrealistic hopes for government restrictions 
on factory competition collapsed, the revolution lost much of its popular support. 
Weinlig, for his part, refused to abandon the journeymen to the vagaries of mod-
ernization, proposing instead ''a middle path between industrial freedom and guild 
regulation. " 53 His plan was to organize craftsmen, factory owners and proletarians 
along "corporative" lines and thus to apply the notion of "association," current 
in journeyman and social liberal circles for years, in an essentially conservative 
manner. 54 Weinlig realized that ''chaos would ensue upon the introduction of unlimited 
industrial freedom''; he therefore favoured ''an organic arrangement of society according 
to natural and thus legitimate estates (Stiinde). " 55 
Although Weinlig based his proposals on an accurate perception of social and 
economic conditions in Saxony, he underestimated the artisans' hostility toward 
modernization and their determination to defend the old order. Nothing short of 
legal controls on the spread of mechanization would satisfy the thousands of hand-
workers displaced by power looms. Any concession to the factory system provoked 
the wrath of guildsmen, who had opposed the government's economic policy for 
years. Stephan Born, leader of the socialist Verbruderung in Berlin, ominously 
described the connection between social unrest and political protest. '' . . . [W]e 
are different from the majority of German Socialists ... ",wrote Born, "[in] that 
we do not regard the social question as something independent of the political 
movement... The more we assert historical grounds in dealing with the social 
question, the more clearly we want to bring out the recognition of a powerful class 
struggle in society." 56 Weinlig's purpose, on the contrary, was to neutralize the 
social question as a political issue. He intended to do so by ending the turmoil that 
resulted from the increasingly unequal rivalry between modern industry and artisan 
manufacture. 
The dilemma confronting Weinlig found expression in a memorandum from 
a group of Dresden industrialists to the Pre-Parliament which met in Frankfurt in 
April 1848. "We wish to announce a competition", wrote the businessmen, "for 
a prize of 100,000 thaler for the answer to the difficult question: short of encroaching 
on property and the freedom to earn a living, without constraining talent and 
industry, without the guild control of business being exercised in such a way that 
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whole industrial enterprises are ruined by a single speculator-how can the lot of 
the worker be improved without destroying the factories?" 57 Unwilling to accept 
the solution demanded by the artisans and their political organization, the radical 
republican Vaterlandsverein, Weinlig sought a compromise based on the premise 
that traditional and modem economic institutions could coexist during the transition 
to industrialism. He prepared a new industrial code (Gewerbeordnung) to replace 
the 1840 ordinance, a draft which the entire cabinet discussed in May 1850. Weinlig 
hoped that his proposal would remove the causes of working-class opposition to 
the state, thereby cutting the ground from under the strong labour organizations 
which had arisen in Leipzig and Chemnitz during the revolution. 58 
Weinlig's design called for the creation of chambers of commerce, industrial 
councils and courts of arbitration in order to give both employers and labour a voice 
in business decisions. But irreconcilable conflict between the guildsmen's demand 
for job security and that of factory owners for a free labour market wrecked his 
compromise. Handicraft workers insisted on employment guarantees that could not 
be provided, while the government rejected labour's attempts to alter working 
conditions. The interior ministry consequently withdrew Weinlig's draft from con-
sideration on May 28, and three days later brought the era of revolutionary reform 
to a close. With the recall of the pre-March Landtag, the guilds regained nominal 
control over economic policy and the modernizers appeared to have been defeated. 59 
Because Weinlig stayed at his post in the interior ministry during the "reac-
tionary" 1850s, the modernization of economic institutions in fact continued throughout 
a decade of political repression. W einlig' s strategy, approved by the prime minister, 
Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, remained one of gradual evolution toward industrial 
freedom. Biedermann and the social liberals had advised a similar approach before 
the revolution, and Weinlig apparently concurred. Thus he combined "technological 
freedom with social restraint" and moved steadily toward technical innovation 
within a stable political system. 60 Such retrograde institutions as the guild corporations 
had to be tolerated during the shift to full-scale industrialization in order to represent 
the interests of handicraftsmen. Convinced of the need to make the transition to 
the new system of production as smooth as possible, Weinlig resurrected his 1850 
draft a few years later and re-submitted it as his solution to the perennial social 
question. 
In the proposed industrial code of 1857, W einlig suppressed the guilds and 
replaced them with industrial and craftworker associations established to administer 
social welfare plans for their members. He recommended such measures as 
unemployment insurance, profit-sharing plans for workers in smaller enterprises, 
restrictions on child and female labOur, and a number of other remedies for mass 
suffering. As had happened seven years before, traditionalists denounced him as a 
revolutionary and modernizers accused him of being too conservative. Guild officials 
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defended their ancient privileges as heartily as ever, while factory owners still called 
loudly for industrial freedom. Heinrich Bodemer, the industrialist whose defence 
of the factory had impressed Biedermann in the 1840s, pointed out that the guilds 
had instigated revolution in 1848 and ought therefore to be uprooted once and for 
all. 61 Unprepared to impose this radical solution, the government once again postponed 
a decision and another stalemate resulted. 
Weinlig's defeat in 1857 was, however, more apparent than real, for this 
time he had succeeded in exposing the fatal weaknesses in the guild organization 
of labour. Once the economic foundation of Saxony's urban life, the guilds could 
no longer defend their own territory nor adequately protect the interests of their 
members. Unrelenting industrialization pointed toward a future dominated by factory 
cities inhabited by overwhelming numbers of wage labourers. At the end of the 
1850s, as the "new era" dawned in Germany, increasing pressure for unification 
reflected a changing economic climate throughout Central Europe. Aided by these 
developments, Saxony's modernizers soon won the day. 
The industrial law (Gewerbegesetz) of 15 October 1861 confirmed an under-
standing between Weinlig and Beust that the time had come to abolish half-measures 
and to embrace industrial freedom without reservation. By this time, Austria and 
several other German states, though not Prussia, had espoused industrial freedom. 62 
In spite of vigorous opposition from the guilds, the new law suspended their privileges 
with compensation, leaving them as purely voluntary organizations. Social insurance 
received less attention than in the 1857 draft, and participation in sickness and 
accident plans was left a matter of choice. 63 On the other hand, child labour in 
factories was now forbidden though not completely eliminated (children from twelve 
to fourteen years of age could work only ten hours a day and had to receive some 
education). The trade councils and tribunals Weinlig had suggested four years earlier 
now came into existence, intended as a means of arbitrating minor wage disputes. 
Going beyond the 1857 draft, the ordinance of 1861 conferred the rights of association 
and strike. It also forbade employers to pay their workers in kind rather than cash. 
Weinlig thus constructed a system which removed archaic fetters on economic 
growth, but which also protected the working class against the depredations of 
laissez-faire. His industrial legislation remained in force until superseded by the 
Reich Gewerbeordnung of 1869. In that year Prussia adopted industrial freedom 
on the same paternalistic terms as had Saxony . Building on precedents estab-
lished in both states , Bismarck subsequently erected a system of social welfare 
measures and labour codes which provided Germany's factory proletariat with a 
degree of security unmatched in other industrializing countries . When the Reichstag 
enacted sickness, accident and old-age insurance between 1883 and 1889, Germany 
in fact "return[ed] to the old principle of state interference applied to a new economic 
background. " 64 Regardless of the motives that underlay Bismarck's social legislation, 
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in particular his determination to halt the growth of Social Democracy, 65 state 
solicitude for the welfare of labour had a long history behind it. Biedermann's 
social liberal philosophy and Weinlig's reform of industrial legislation had strengthened 
this tradition by emphasizing the state's responsibility for easing the birth of an 
industrial society. 
Saxony's rulers handled the transition in a manner that revealed their concern 
for those whom the modernization process displaced and dispossessed. Because the 
imperial government responded in a similarly adroit manner to the problems of 
massive industrialization later in the century, Germany avoided a repetition of the 
1848-49 upheavals. The country's industrialists, academics, bureaucrats and politicians 
all supported the evolution of a social policy matched to the basic needs of a modem 
industrial state. 66 Their efforts assisted in achieving impressive economic growth 
and, the revolutionary rhetoric of the Social Democratic Party notwithstanding, 
social peace. These accomplishments fostered the illusion that Bismarck's authoritarian 
Reich, now aspiring to great power status, stood on firm foundations. 
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